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ARTICLE

UNLAWFUL STATUS AS A
"CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCY"?:
THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
JASON H. LEE·

In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Plyler v. Doe, the first and only case in which it
has addressed the level of scrutiny applicable to state classifications of illegal immigrants
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a complex and
internally incoherent opinion, the Court declared that unlawful status is not a "constitutional
irrelevancy" and thus proceeded to hold that classifications based on illegal immigrant status
deserve only rational-basis review, even though classifications of legal immigrants are
accorded strict judicial scrutiny. Subsequent courts have since cited to Plyler to uphold
discriminatory legislation stripping illegal immigrants of basic economic and social benefits.
With the recent rise in anti-illegal-immigrant sentiment, as evidenced by the passing of
several state and local laws targeting the undocumented community, there is a serious risk
that illegal immigrants in America will soon be converted into an outlaw caste, outside of the
protection of the laws and neglected as nonpersons by those who nevertheless benefit from
the contributions that they make to American society. The Equal Protection Clause extends
its protections to all "persons" within the United States' jurisdiction, including those who are
unlawfully present in this country, and it should be interpreted in a manner that allows it to
fulfill its universalist textual promise. This Article argues that the Supreme Court should reexamine its holding in Plyler and find that unlawful status is constitutionally irrelevant in the
equal-protection context. Put differently, the Supreme Court should apply the same legal
standard to illegal immigrant classifications that it accords legal immigrant classifications:
strict-scrutiny review.

'J.D. 2007, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); B.A. 2004, Brown
University. Thanks to Goodwin Liu, Stephen Lee, Vidhya Prahbakaran, and the editors at the
GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW for their helpful thoughts and suggestions. I would also
like to thank Milou for all of her support and care.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent times, arguably no community living within the United
States has been as politically unpopular as the nation's swelling
population of undocumented immigrants. 1 These immigrants have been
accused of sapping government resources, 2 engaging in criminal
behavior,3 overcrowding school classrooms,4 and disrupting the labor
market by contributing to the lowering of wages as well as by occupying
jobs that would have otherwise gone to citizens or legal immigrants. 5
The number of illegal immigrants in the United States has skyrocketed
over the last two decades, reaching an estimated 12 million by 2005. 6
According to some reports, this population grows by as many as 500,000
people each year.?
Within the American undocumented community, the vast majority
hail from Mexico, 8 with a sizeable population coming from other Latin
I I use the terms "illegal immigrant" and "undocumented immigrant" interchangeably
throughout this Article. They are meant to denote noncitizens who are present in the United States
without legal permission. These individuals may have initially entered the country without
authorization or may have entered legally but then overstayed their visas or violated a condition of
their admission.
2 See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Why Are Taxpayers Providing Hospital Care of lllegal Aliens?,
HUMAN EVENTS, Aug. 12, 2002, at 9; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 249 (\982) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
3 See, e.g., Dennis Hollingsworth, Flawed Studies Ignore the Real Impact of Illegal
Immigration,
NORTH
COUNTY
TIMES,
Mar.
10,
2007,
www.nctimes.comIarticles/2007/03117/perspective/16_28_123_1O_07.txt; Pa. City Gets Tough on

Immigration; Hazleton, PA., Says Employers And Landlords Of Illegal Immigrants Face Steep
Fines,
Associated
Press,
July
14,
2006,
www.cbsnews.comIstories/2006/07/14/national/main 18043 72.shtml.
4 See, e.g., Thomas R. Ruge & Angela D. Iza, Higher Education for Undocumented

Students: The Case for Open Admission and In-State Tuition Rates for Students Without Lawful
Immigration Status, 15 IND. INT'L COMPo L. REv. 257, 276 (2005) ("Opponents argue that ...
allowing undocumented students to go to college will, in turn, deny opportunities to deserving U.S.
citizens.").
5 See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (\976) ("Employment of illegal aliens in
times of high unemployment deprives citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs; acceptance by
illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress
wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens .... ").
6 FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, How MANY ILLEGAL ALIENS?,
http://www.fairus.orgisite/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersb8ca (last visited Apr.
2, 2008). An estimated thirty-three percent of undocumented immigrants in the United States in
2000 initially entered the country with some type of authorization. Ruge & lza, supra note 4, at 258.
7 FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, How MANY ILLEGAL ALIENS?,
http://www.fairus.orgisitelPageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersb8ca (last visited Apr.
2,2008).
8 In 2000, the Census Bureau estimated that there were 3,871,912 undocumented
immigrants from Mexico living in the United States, while the Immigration and Naturalization
Service put this number at 4,808,000. Id.
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American countries,9 Cuba, China, and India. lo It is important to keep in
mind, however, that undocumented immigrants come, in relatively large
numbers, from all over the world, including developed nations such as
the United Kingdom and Germany. I I Once in the United States, illegal
immigrants tend to settle in California, Texas, and Florida, with large
numbers also in New York, Arizona, and Illinois.12
In reaction to the growing size of the illegal immigrant population
and to common perceptions about this population's negative effects on
American society, the 1980s and 90s witnessed a surge in anti-illegalimmigrant hostility. It was during this period that Congress passed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,13 which, among other
things, penalizes employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens. 14
It was also during this period, in 1996, that Congress enacted the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act l5 and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,16 a set
of laws that cut millions of legal and illegal immigrants off from federal
benefits programs.
At the state level, legislators and voters have been equally as active,
enacting laws designed to strip undocumented immigrants of valuable
social and economic rights. In 1994, the California electorate passed
Proposition 187, which prohibited undocumented immigrants from
receiving public social services, publicly funded health care, public
elementary and secondary education, and public post-secondary
education within the state. 17 Although the various provisions of the
initiative never became effective law and were ultimately found
unconstitutional under the preemption doctrine,18 the fact that they were

9 The Census Bureau's estimated number of undocumented immigrants from EI Salvador in
2000 was 336,717. The number for native Guatemalans was 238,977. [d.
10 The Census Bureau's estimated number of undocumented immigrants from Cuba, China,
and India in 2000 was 216,297, 226,886, and 200,306, respectively. [d.
II The estimated number of United Kingdom citizens living unlawfully in the United States
in 2000 was 123,246, and the number for German citizens was 113,327, both of which represent
fairly sizeable populations. [d.

12 HANS P. JOHNSON, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 4

(2006), available at http://www.ppic.org/contentipubs/atissue/AC406HJAI.pdf.
13 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (Westlaw 2007).
14
8 U.S.C.A. § I 324a(a)(2) (Westlaw 2007).
15 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
16 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
17 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 787-90 (C.O. Cal.
1995).
18 In 1997, a federal district court held that "substantially all of the provisions of Proposition
187" were unconstitutional and thus invalid. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F.
Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.O. Cal 1997). After Gray Davis was elected governor of California in 1998, he
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passed by a significant majority of California voters serves as a powerful
example of the strong anti-illegal immigrant sentiment that thrived in the
mid-1990s. This animus is still alive today; Texas state legislators
recently considered a bill that would not only deny public services to
illegal immigrants but also deprive their American-born children of
birthright citizenship.19
Finally, over the last several years a number of city and county
governments have begun to consider restrictive ordinances as well. On
October 18, 2006, the City of Escondido, California, located in northern
San Diego County, adopted a law that penalizes "any person or business
that owns a dwelling unit" that "'let[s], lease[s] or rent[s] a dwelling unit
to an illegal alien.,,20 In this way, it attempted to exclude illegal
immigrants from access to a major source of housing and shelter. Earlier
in 2006, the city council of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, passed a set of laws
that sought to "deny licenses to businesses that employ illegal
immigrants, fine landlords $1,000 for each illegal immigrant discovered
renting their properties, and require city documents to be in English
only.,,21
What legal recourse do illegal immigrants have to fight against this
wave of discriminatory legislation against them? What strategies can
they pursue to insure their access to basic economic and social services
such as housing, public education, and medical services?
With respect to federal classifications of immigrants (both legal and
illegal immigrants), the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the
judgments of Congress, citing Congress's constitutional grant of

dropped the state's appeal of this decision and essentially killed the initiative.
19 Miguel Bustillo, Texas May Pull Up the Welcome Mat; The State, Long Friendly to Illegal
Immigrants, Debates Tough Limits, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007, at AI. Birthright citizenship is
citizenship conferred upon an individual at the time of his or her birth, as opposed to citizenship
attained through the formal process of naturalization.
20 Escondido,
Cal.,
Ordinance
2006-38R (Oct.
18,
2006), available at
http://www.ci.escondido.ca.us/immigrationiOrd-2006-38R.pdf (Establishing Penalties for the
Harboring of Illegal Aliens in the City of Escondido); see also Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F.
Supp. 2d 1043, 1047-48 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (granting a temporary restraining order barring the city
from enforcing the ordinance).
21 Pa. City Gets Tough on Immigration; Hazleton, PA., Says Employers And Landlords Of
Illegal
Immigrants
Face
Steep
Fines,
Associated
Press,
July
14,
2006,
www.cbsnews.comlstories/2006/07114/national/mainI804372.shtmI.SeeHazleton.Pa .• Ordinance
2006-13, (Aug. 15,2006) (LandlordlTenant Ordinance); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sep. 21,
2006) (Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (Sep. 21, 2006)
(Official English Ordinance). The text of each one of these laws can be retrieved from a website
established by the Mayor of Hazleton that encourages other small towns to adopt similar ordinances.
See Small Town Defenders, http://www.smalltowndefenders.comlpublic/node/6 (last visited Apr. 2,
2008).
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"plenary power" over issues of immigration. 22 Consequently, federal
action that discriminates against noncitizens almost always survives
judicial scrutiny.23 The merits of this plenary-power doctrine adopted by
the Court can be questioned and has been thoughtfully criticized by a
number ofscholars. 24 This article, however, will not address the plenarypower doctrine or its limitations.
Instead, this article focuses on state discrimination against illegal
immigrants and the use of equal-protection doctrine to protect these
immigrants' rights to enjoy the array of benefits and services offered by
state governments. There are two main reasons why this article will
focus on the Equal Protection Clause rather than on federal preemption
doctrine, which is the other major tool that illegal immigrants can use to
attack discriminatory state classifications. First, the equal-protection
doctrine highlights the dignity and membership of an individual in
American society in a way that the more structural preemption analysis
does not. 25 Second, preemption has become the more common, and
successful, tactic over the last twenty years, leaving the equal-protection
approach under-explored and undeveloped since the early 19808. It is
time to revive the analysis of illegal immigrants' right to strong equal
protection of the laws, both to highlight their equal moral membership in
America and because the preemption approach does not always prevail.
State classifications of immigrants, unlike federal classifications,
are not protected by the plenary power doctrine. Instead, the Supreme
Court's alienage cases reason that states typically have no business
distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens, a strictly federal
concern, and thus generally subject state alienage classifications to strictscrutiny review. 26 The caveat for illegal immigrants, however, is that

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-83 (1976).
Id. at 83; Michael Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493, 496 (2001).
24 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. I, 1-22, 53-66, 73-74 (1998); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
25 Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 98-99 (1985).
26 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. I, 7, 12 (1977); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634,642,646 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365,371-72 (1971); Wishnie, supra note 23, at 496. Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review
22
23

accorded by the courts to state classifications. In order to survive strict scrutiny, a challenged law
must be "necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 645 (2d ed. 2002). Otherwise, it will be struck
down. This is a high standard that usually leads to the invalidation of a challenged statute or
regulation. Id.
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they are not accorded the same degree of equal protection of the laws as
legal immigrants. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court declared that
unlawful status is not a "constitutional irrelevancy.,,27 While the Court
was not completely clear on the level of review appropriate for
classifications of illegal immigrants, it is clear that it found strict scrutiny
inappropriate. 28 Moreover, except perhaps for legislation affecting both
illegal immigrant children and their access to primary and secondary
education, it appears from the Court's language that it chose to endorse
the rational-basis standard of review. 29 This result is incorrect. Illegal
immigrant classifications should be held to the same standard of review
as legal immigrant classifications: strict scrutiny. Contrary to the
opinion of the Plyler majority, unlawful status should be a constitutional
irrelevancy.
This article is organized in the following manner. Part I breaks
down the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Plyler v. Doe, the first and
only case in which it addressed the equal-protection status of illegal
immigrants. In doing so, the article distills the justifications that the
Court provides for declaring the constitutional relevance of unlawful
status, which will then serve as the topics of discussion for the rest of the
article's critiques. Part II reviews four cases from outside the equalprotection context that conclude that unlawful status is irrelevant to an
illegal immigrant's right to receive the same protection of the laws as
citizens and legal immigrants. It then explores and rejects possible
reasons why the Court chose not to follow the approach adopted by these
cases, and highlights the importance of according illegal immigrants a
strong version of the equal protection of the laws. Finally, Part III argues
that illegal immigrants are morally entitled to the same benefits and
services provided by states to legal immigrants as well as most of the
benefits reserved for citizens. This is accomplished through the
27 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982). There has been recent discussion
among scholars and in at least one court about whether Congress can devolve its immigration
powers to the states, a consequence of which would be the extension of the plenary power shield
from equal-protection liability to state classifications of immigrants. This issue is beyond the scope
of this article. It is important to point out, however, that the Court of Appeals of New York has
concluded that Congress may not devolve its plenary power over immigration to the states. Aliessa
v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2001). Additionally, scholars and practitioners have
argued against the legality and prudence of devolution. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 23, at 496;
Ellen M. Yacknin, "Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role 0/ States in
Immigration
Policy": Aliessa and Equal Protection/or Immigrants, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 391 (2002).
28 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19.
29 See discussion in Part I, below. Rational-basis review "is the minimum level of scrutiny
that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet." CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, at 645. Under this standard, "a law will be upheld if it is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose." Id. at 646.

u.s.
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articulation and application of a participation model of rights that stresses
the moral significance of an individual's membership within a society
rather than his or her status as a citizen or legal immigrant.
I. PLYLER V. DOE: UNLAWFUL STATUS AS CONSTITUTIONALLY
RELEVANT

In Graham v. Richardson, decided in 1971, the Supreme Court
established that the Equal Protection Clause requires that state
classifications of legal immigrants in the United States be held to the
standard of strict-scrutiny review. 30 It reasoned that "classifications
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.,,3! Highlighting the
traditional powerlessness of aliens, who as a class lack the ability to vote
and thus directly influence the political process, the Court further noted
that legal "[a]liens ... are a prime example of. .. 'discrete and insular'
minorit[ies] for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is
appropriate.,,32 This decision has been applauded by several immigration
and constitutional law scholars, not just because it protects the rights of a
politically weak and historically abused group,33 but also because it
recognizes the fact that legal immigrants contribute much to American
society and, in many ways, resemble citizens in their daily actions. As
noted by the Court in Graham, "Aliens like citizens pay taxes and may
be called into the armed forces .... [They] may live within a state for
many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of
the state.,,34 Indeed, due to the fact that oftentimes very little
distinguishes the activities and contributions of citizens and legal
immigrants except for their official status, Alexander Aleinikoff, Dean of
the Georgetown University Law Center, has aptly referred to such
immigrants as "citizens-in-training" who should be accorded near-equal
treatment as full citizens, including a wide range of economic and social
rights. 35
In contrast to the Supreme Court's provision of strong equal-

Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
ld. at 372.
32
1d.

30

31

33 See Wishnie, supra note 23, at 555 ("[TJhere are reasons to be particularly concerned
about anti-immigrant discrimination at the state or local level. Subfederal alienage classifications
have an extensive history.").
34 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
35 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
915,921 (1995).
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protection rights to legal aliens, the Court has historically treated illegal
immigrants in a less favorable manner. Despite the fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment has been found to apply to all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States, including illegal immigrants,36 the Court
held in Plyler v. Doe that illegal immigrants are not a "suspect class.,,37
It reasoned that undocumented status was not a "constitutional
irrelevancy,,,38 and thus determined that state classifications based on the
status of illegal alienage are subject to a lower standard of review than
the strict scrutiny accorded to classifications of legal immigrants. 39
Instead, the Plyler Court applied an intermediate level of review,
requiring the state to prove that the legislation under review - a Texas
law denying undocumented children access to a free public education40 furthered some "substantial goal.,,41 It justified this intermediate level of
scrutiny by reasoning that illegal immigrant children did not choose to
come to the United States but instead were brought into the country by
their parents. 42 The Court thus did not find these children morally
culpable or responsible for their illegal status. 43 Additionally, the Plyler
majority highlighted the importance of an education for children, arguing
that prohibiting an illegal immigrant child from attaining a free public
education would condemn him or her to a stigmatized and socially and
economically marginalized life. 44 In this way the Court created a unique
justification for the use of an intermediate level of review that was
inconsistent with previously established equal-protection doctrine. 45
This part of the majority's holding, however, has been both criticized by
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982).
[d. at 219 n.19.
38 [d.
36
37

See id.
[d. at 205.
41 [d. at 224.
42 [d. at 220.
39

40

43

[d.

44 [d. at 223. The Supreme Court elaborated on its concern for educating illegal immigrant
youths by stating:

Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for
their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By
denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure
of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in
even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.
!d.
45 See id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's opinion rests on such a unique
confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for little beyond the results in these
particular cases."); Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v.
Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 167, 169 (1982).
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scholars46 and interpreted narrowly by subsequent courts as limited to its
specific facts (a state classification affecting illegal immigrant children
and their access to public education).47 Indeed, no court has applied
intermediate review to a classification of illegal immigrants except in
Plyler.
Plyler has instead been cited principally for its more negative view
toward adult illegal immigrants. In this way, lower courts have
interpreted Plyler's declaration of the constitutional relevancy of
unlawful status to mean that state classifications of illegal immigrants are
due only rational-basis review, at least with respect to state action
affecting illegal immigrants older than eighteen and outside the
That is, such
kindergarten-to-twelfth-grade education context. 48
classifications need to bear only "some fair relationship to a legitimate
public purpose,,,49 an extremely easy standard to meet, which has been
employed in numerous cases since Plyler to uphold local legislation
designed to exclude illegal immigrants from benefits available to citizens
and other categories of immigrants. 50 For example, since Plyler, lower
courts have cited to its less favorable equal-protection ruling to uphold a
state law that prohibits the issuance of state drivers' licenses to illegal
immigrants,51 to find that a state's denial of vocational rehabilitation to
undocumented workers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,52 and
to conclude that a state regulation excluding illegal immigrants from
46 See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual
Agenda of the Constitutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv.
329,339-40 (1983) (observing several flaws in the Plyler majority's opinion and accusing the Court
of improper judicial activism). But see Gerald Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services,
Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1443-44
(1995) (noting that the Plyler majority adopted an intermediate level of review for legislation
affecting undocumented immigrant children and approving of this development in equal-protection
doctrine).
47 See, e.g., State v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 627 (Alaska 1993) (narrowly interpreting Plyler's
intermediate review holding and rejecting the illegal immigrant plaintiffs' equal-protection claim,
noting that they are both adults and that the permanent fund dividend that they sought was not
"comparable to education"); Am. G.l. Forum v. Miller, 267 Cal. Rptr. 371,376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
("The[] factors of nonaccountability for status and lifetime hardship are not present here. Therefore,
the test in this case is whether collecting and disseminating 'undocumented person' information
'bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose."'); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership,
Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1124-26 (1994).
48 See, e.g., Cosio, 858 P.2d at 627; Am. G.I. Forum, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 376; Bosniak, supra
note 47, at 1124-26.
49 Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
50 See Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity o/the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 955, 984 (1988).
51 Doe No.1 v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369,1373,1376 (N.D. Ga.
2001).
52 Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 182-83 (Nev. 2001).
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eligibility to receive permanent fund dividends was permissible. 53
In contrast to the Supreme Court's view of undocumented
children's moral innocence, it used rather bold language to describe the
impropriety of adult illegal immigrants' choices to violate American
immigration laws, and suggested that they have no right to feel entitled
to receive any of the benefits provided by a state to its residents. 54 The
Court noted, "Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may
withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the
United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct.,,55 It further
declared that "undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper
legislative goaL... [N]or is undocumented status an absolutely
immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious ... unlawful
action.,,56 It is this tone and view of the Court that informs unlawful
status's alleged constitutional relevance, not the more sympathetic
language that the Court employed when discussing illegal immigrant
children and education.
In order to justify its different constitutional treatment of legal and
illegal immigrants, the Plyler Court relied primarily on the fact that
illegal immigrants are within the United States without official
government permission. 57 According to the Court, "those who elect to
enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be
prepared to bear the consequences" of their actions,58 which include
deportation and exclusion from certain state benefits. Chief Justice
Burger's dissent articulated this line of reasoning more bluntly: "By
definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state
may reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with
governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the
state.,,59
The Plyler Court also articulated a second justification for
distinguishing between state classifications of legal and illegal
immigrants - a state's interest in protecting its economy and preserving
its limited financial resources. 60 While recognizing that "the relationship
between the alien and this country" is normally an exclusive federal

Cosio, 858 P.2d at 626-29.
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20.
55 [d. at 219.
56 [d. at 220.
57 See id. at 219.
58 [d. at 219-20.
59 [d. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
60 [d. at 229 n.23.
53
54
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interest and thus irrelevant to legislation by a state,61 the Court referred to
its reasoning in De Canas v. Bica,62 a federal preemption case that it
decided six years earlier, and concluded: "Despite the exclusive federal
control of this Nation's borders, we cannot conclude that the States are
without any power to deter the influx of persons entering the United
States against federal law, and whose numbers might have a discernible
impact on traditional state concems.,,63 Such state concerns, according to
the Court, include a state's ability to provide important government
services to its residents and to make sure that it has a healthy economy.64
Thus, even though De Canas was a federal preemption case, the Plyler
Court adopted De Canas's distinction between state action affecting
legal and illegal immigrants as part of new equal-protection doctrine.
Upon initial inspection, the Court's justifications for providing
illegal immigrants a weaker set of rights under the Equal Protection
Clause than legal immigrants seems to make sense. After all, the Equal
Protection Clause was designed to "protect against arbitrary and
irrational classifications,,65 and it can be argued that the classification of
illegal immigrants in a group distinct from, and less favored than, legal
immigrants is both principled and rational. Technically speaking, legal
and illegal immigrants are not similarly situated in the United States.
One group is present with the official permission of the U.S. government
while the other group is not. Upon deeper consideration, however, the
Supreme Court's distinction between legal and illegal immigrants begins
to lose much of its force doctrinally, morally, and empirically.
The remainder of this article examines a variety of reasons why the
Court should revisit its holding in Plyler regarding state classifications of
illegal immigrants outside the context of children and their access to
public education. However, unlike those who think that the Court should
adopt a lower standard of rational-basis review,66 this article argues that
the Supreme Court should treat legal and illegal immigrants as
indistinguishable, and thus accord illegal immigrant classifications strict
judicial scrutiny.

61

62
63

Id. at 225 (citation omitted).
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 n.23.

See id.
Id. at 245 (Burger, C.1., dissenting).
66 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 46, at 339-40.
64

65
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II. THE ANOMALOUS ROLE OF UNLAWFUL STATUS IN EQUALPROTECTION DOCTRINE

The following discussion lays out a first set of objections against the
Supreme Court's holding in Plyler. By examining a group of cases from
lower courts, this section highlights that unlawful status, standing alone,
has consistently been held to be irrelevant in a variety of legal contexts,
and that the U.S. Supreme Court provides no principled explanation for
treating the issue of unlawful status differently in the equal-protection
realm than in others. Moreover, this section reveals that the Court's
improper decision to treat equal-protection doctrine as unique has
significant consequences, as it essentially allows illegal immigrants to be
considered outlaws, free to be abused as members of a special caste in
American society.
A. LEGAL TREND OUTSIDE OF THE EQUAL-PROTECTION CONTEXT
While the Supreme Court in Plyler explicitly declared the
immigration status of illegal immigrants relevant (and determinative)
when deciding their legal rights, there exists a long line of state and
federal cases, addressing diverse areas of the law outside the realm of
equal protection, that have concluded otherwise. 67 For example, over the
last half century, state and federal courts have held that illegal
immigrants possess the right to sue in tort and contract, bring actions for
divorce, recover workers' compensation, receive due process oflaw, and
seek relief under federal labor-protection statutes, regardless of their
unlawful presence within the nation's borders. 68 In these cases, various
courts found the fact that illegal immigrants do not have the
government's permission to be in the country not to be determinative, a
fact that the Plyler Court found to be the most important reason for
providing such individuals weaker equal-protection rights than are
provided to legal immigrants. As this article discusses below, some

67 See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987); Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d
1300, 1308 (5th Cir. 1981); Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep't of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1087, 1094 (Kan.
2007); Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1105-06 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979);
Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1258-60 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).
68 Bosniak, supra note 50, at 978-82; see, e.g., Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v.
Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635.637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) ("We conclude that a person residing in this
State whose entry may be contrary to the immigration laws is not barred, by that reason alone, from
receiving workmen's compensation benefits."); Comment, Equal Protection for Undocumented
Aliens, 5 CHICANO L. REv. 29, 45-48 (1982) (discussing a range of cases in which courts have
decided to grant undocumented immigrants the same protection of the laws as citizens and legal
immigrants).
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courts69 have continued to insist on the irrelevancy of illegal status even
in the face of recent precedent that appears to state the contrary.70
In Moreau v. Oppenheim, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a district court judgment in favor of plaintiffs who were
unlawfully present in the United States on five separate causes of action,
including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and tortious
interference with business and contractual relations. 71 In doing so, it
rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs' illegal status
rendered their legal claims invalid. The defendant argued, with respect
to the plaintiffs' tortious interference claims, that "as illegal aliens,
[plaintiffs] had no right to come into federal court and demand damages
for 'what (they) could have earned by entering into and performing
illegal employment in violation of the regulations and laws of the United
States. ".12 The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed. 73 In holding for the
plaintiffs, it reasoned: "We seriously doubt whether illegal entry,
standing alone, makes outlaws of individuals, permitting their contracts
to be breached without legal accountability.,,74 The appellate court's use
of the term "outlaw" here is telling. It suggests a principle adopted by
the court that one illegal act, such as being in the country without official
permission, does not make a member of society an outlaw for all
purposes. 75
.
The Fifth Circuit's use of the term outlaw is of note for another
reason as well. It foreshadows Professor Gerald Neuman's concern,
articulated twenty-four years later, that applying only rational-basis
review to state classifications of illegal immigrants will effectively
convert such immigrants into outlaws, "non-person[s]. .. outside the
protection of the legal system.,,76 According to Neuman, affording
illegal immigrants only rational-basis equal protection will leave states
free to cut the undocumented population from all kinds of important
69 I chose the four cases to examine in this section, out of the many that have found unlawful
status irrelevant to an individual's right to certain benefits of the law, because each one does a good
job highlighting a particular benefit of disregarding unlawful status or harm from recognizing its
significance.
70 It is important to note that this recent precedent in no way represented an announcement
by the Supreme Court of a constitutional principle recognizing the relevance of unlawful status.
Instead, it involved a federal statute targeting illegal immigrant employment, which Congress was
permitted to enact, despite its clear discriminatory effects, under the plenary power doctrine. See
Hoffinan Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148-49 (2002).
71 Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (5th Cir. 1981).
72 [d. at 1307.
73 [d. at 1308.
74 [d.
75
76

The Rights of Undocumented Aliens, 96 HARV. L REv. 1433, 1454 (1983).
See Neuman, supra note 46, at 1441-44.
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government services that are necessary to secure a humane livelihood.
As an extreme example, he suggests that even excluding illegal
immigrants from basic services such as police protection and the
prosecution of crimes committed against them would pass constitutional
muster under a rational-basis regime. 77 Paralleling the logic expressed
by the Plyler dissent,78 which advocated strongly for rational-basis
review of illegal-immigrant classifications, Neuman points out that such
services "have incremental costs, and they create marginal incentives"
for other individuals to try to illegally immigrate to the United States. 79
Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Plyler dissent would deem
the extreme actions of depriving illegal immigrants of police protection
and other basic services as possessing a fair relationship to legitimate
state goals. 8o This is particularly so given that Chief Justice Burger's
dissent notes that "the Equal Protection Clause does not mandate that a
state choose either the most effective and all-encompassing means of
addressing a problem or none at all.,,81
Such treatment of a segment of American society, however, would
seem to violate the basic principles of equality and dignity underlying the
Equal Protection Clause. 82 Converting illegal immigrants into outlaws
"would deny them the minimal respect for their humanity that the state
owes even to criminals - and even to criminals whose crimes are more
serious than the immigration violations of which 'illegal' aliens may be
guilty.,,83 The Plyler majority noted the development of a permanent
caste of illegal immigrants living and working in the United States, a socalled shadow population. 84 Denying illegal immigrants strong equal
protection of the laws, especially given the long history of anti-illegalimmigrant treatment within the law 85 and more recent proposals to limit
[d. at 1447.
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 250 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Without laboring what
will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply is not 'irrational' for a state to conclude that it
does not have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the
state and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully present.").
79 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1447.
80 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger reasons: "The Texas law might also be justified as a
means of deterring unlawful immigration. While regulation of immigration is an exclusively federal
function, a state may take steps, consistent with federal immigration policy, to protect its economy
and ability to provide governmental services from the 'deleterious effects' of a massive influx of
illegal immigrants." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 249 n.l 0 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
81 [d.
77

78

82 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1,4-8 (1977).
83 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1448.
84 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19.
85 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1448 n.109; Wishnie, supra note 23, at 555.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss1/1

14

Lee: Equal Protection For Illegal Immigrants

2008] EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

15

illegal immigrants' access to basics for survival such as housing 86 and
employment,87 will only ensure that this shadow population will remain
perpetually destitute and susceptible to various kinds of abuse. Most
members of this caste will not just leave the United States and return to
their home countries after being denied access to government services.
The majority of illegal immigrants come to the United States not for the
benefits provided by the government to its residents but for jobs, 88 which
will always illicitly be available for immigrants to occupy, whether it is
serving as a busboy at a restaurant, a janitor at a hospital, or working in
agricultural fields. Moreover, many illegal immigrants have come to the
United States to escape persecution or extreme poverty at home. Such
individuals will not just pack up their items and leave the country once
they find that they no longer have access to certain state-provided
benefits. Rather, they will remain - poor, abused, and forgotten members of the shadow population that the Plyler Court was so
concerned about.
Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co. is another notable case in which a
court found an illegal immigrant's unlawful presence in the United States
irrelevant when deciding whether he was entitled to certain protections of
the law. 89 In Montoya, the plaintiff initially entered the United States as
a "visitor for pleasure" but then remained in the country despite never
receiving official permission to do SO.90 He eventually began taking on
employment and ended up working at one job for over a year until he
was prevented from doing so by injuries suffered in a serious automobile
accident. 91 The plaintiff sought to exercise the personal-injury-protection
provisions of his automobile insurance plan to recover medical costs and
income lost as a result of his injuries.92 When his insurance company
refused to cover all of these expenses, the two parties ended up in court
where the insurance company based its defense on the plaintiffs illegal

86 See Pa. City Gets Tough on Immigration; Hazleton. PA., Says Employers And Landlords
Of Illegal Immigrants Face Steep Fines,
Associated Press, July
14, 2006,
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07114/nationallmain 18043 n.shtml.
87 See id. (discussing proposed local legislation that "would deny licenses to businesses that
employ illegal immigrants").
88 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 ("The dominant incentive for illegal entry into the State of Texas is
the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to
the State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free education."); Ruge & Iza, supra note 4, at
276 (noting that the "availability of public welfare benefits is not what attracts immigrant families to
the Untied States").
89 Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1105-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
90 Id . at 1103.
91
Id .
92 Id .
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immigration status. The appellate court, however, like the Fifth Circuit
in Moreau, denied the significance of illegal alienage. 93 In so holding, it
made a number of interesting and important observations. As part of its
defense, the insurance company argued that the plaintiff could not
recover on his insurance policy because he could not possibly be said to
be "in an occupational status" at the time of the accident since, at the
time, he was prohibited by the law from engaging in gainful pursuits. 94
As policyholders were required to be in an occupational status in order to
recover certain losses, contended the insurance company, the plaintiff
was not eligible to recover on his pOlicy.95 The appellate court disagreed
with this reasoning and concluded that the plaintiffs "illegal presence
and his disability from engaging in gainful pursuits cannot, consistent
with the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy language, be held to
deprive him of occupational status.,,96 The court also rejected the
defendant's claim, based on "obscure considerations of public policy,"
that the plaintiffs unlawful status, in and of itself, prohibited him from
prevailing on his automobile-insurance claim. 97
Montoya is significant not only because it forgave and overlooked
the plaintiffs illegal status when deciding his legal claim, but also
because it appears to have recognized, and attempted to find a just
accommodation for, the reality that there are millions of undocumented
immigrants living and working within America's borders. Despite
border enforcement and other laws aimed at controlling the tide of illegal
immigration, the fact remains that illegal immigrants are here in the
country and are interacting with employers, landlords, and all other
segments of society on a daily basis. To deprive these individuals of
legal recourse for wrongs that they have suffered would create an
incentive for their abuse by others 98 and would also violate basic norms
of fairness and equality underlying the Equal Protection Clause. The
language used by the Montoya court recognizes the idea that illegal
immigrants may be in this country against the law, but the bottom line is
that they are here and thus should be accorded certain rights and
protections so that they will not develop into an outlaw class of
individuals accorded a lower degree of humanity than everyone else in
the United States.
1d. at 1103-05.
Id. at 1105.
95 Id. at 1104-05.
96 1d. at 1105.
97 See id. at 1104.
98 See id. ("Insurance companies may well be encouraged to insure [illegal immigrants) in
93

94

anticipation of being able to renege with impunity after a covered loss has occurred.").
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A third case of interest is In re Reyes,99 in which the Fifth Circuit
discussed the relevancy of unlawful status with respect to coverage by
the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
("A WPA") 100 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA,,).lOl In
that case, the court of appeals held that the protections of both the
A WPA and FLSA applied to citizens, legal immigrants, and illegal
immigrants alike. l02 It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
A WPA specifically prohibits the employment of illegal immigrants by
farmers and farm-labor contractors. 103 The court of appeals also found
unpersuasive the argument that allowing illegal immigrants to recover
benefits on par with legal workers would undercut the statute's policy
goal of deterring further illegal immigration of farm workers. l04 As a
result, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus prohibiting the lower
court from entering a discovery order that would have required the
plaintiffs to reveal their immigration statuses to the COurt. l05 Since the
A WP A and FLSA were deemed to cover illegal immigrants, the
plaintiffs' answers to the discovery order questions regarding their legal
statuses were irrelevant. Moreover, given the irrelevant nature of the
discovery order, the court of appeals worried that it would only serve to
inhibit certain migrant workers from pursuing their rights because of the
possibility that they may be targeted for deportation. lO6 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that undocumented immigrants had the right to utilize
certain labor-protection laws even though those very laws prohibited the
hiring of illegal immigrants. This represents a powerful commitment by
the court to the protection of immigrant workers' rights, including the
rights of the undocumented. It recognizes the humanity and vulnerability
of undocumented farm workers who are often subject to abuse by their
employers. Like the court in Montoya, the Fifth Circuit, in disregarding
the fact that the A WP A actually prohibits the hiring of illegal
immigrants, adopted the attitude that while illegal immigrants may be
present within our borders unlawfully, this does not mean that they
In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168 (1987).
29 U.S.C.A. § 1801-1872 (Westlaw 2007).
101 29 U.S.C.A. § 201-219 (Westlaw 2007).
102 In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 170.
103 See id. at 171-72 (Jones, J., dissenting).
104 See id. at 172 (Jones, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 171. The original discovery order entered by the district court asked the plaintiffs to
answer the following questions: "Are you a citizen of the United States? Ifso, were you born in the
United States? If so, please state where you were born and your birthdate. If you are a naturalized
citizen of the United States, please state where and when you became a citizen of the United States.
If you are not a citizen of the United States, please state your immigration status." Id. at 170.
106 See id. at 170.
99

100
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should be completely stripped of all legal protections. That would allow
such immigrants to be discriminated against and wronged freely, a result
that would offend the spirit of the Constitution. 107
The body of state and federal cases in support of the irrelevancy of
an illegal immigrant's unlawful status has continued to grow even after
the rash of anti-immigrant and anti-illegal-immigrant legislation that was
passed during the 1980s and 90s. For example, in 1986 Congress
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"),108 which
sought to prohibit immigrants from working in the United States without
government authorization 109 and also penalized employers for knowingly
hiring unauthorized immigrants. 110 Based on this legislation, in 2002 the
Supreme Court held, in Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Board, that allowing the National Labor Relations
Board to award back pay to illegal immigrants for their improper
termination would conflict with the explicit statutory goals of the IRCA
and was thus impermissible. III The Court reasoned that any conclusion
to the contrary would only "encourage the successful evasion of
apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the
immigration laws, and encourage future violations.,,1l2 This was very
powerful language against the awarding of back pay and federal labor
remedies to illegal immigrants. While it was not a declaration of the
relevancy of unlawful status as a constitutional principle, it reflected
strong Congressional action against illegal immigration that the Supreme
Court accorded great deference. Even with this legislative and recent
doctrinal history, however, the Court of Appeals of New York, in 2006,
concluded that the unauthorized status of an illegal immigrant did not
preclude her from recovering lost earnings under New York State labor
laws. 113 In Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, the high court of New York
held that a state law awarding an illegal immigrant past wages and future
losses of earnings due to an accident suffered while working was not
preempted by the IRCA. 114 The court distinguished Balbuena from
Hoffman Plastics, decided just four years earlier by the Supreme

107 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1448 ("Like the perpetuation of a caste, the transformation of
unlawful entrants into outlaws who could be mistreated with impunity would violate the core
historical purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.").
108 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (Westlaw 2007).
109 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(h)(3) (Westlaw 2007).
110 8 U.S.C.A. § I 324a(a)(2) (Westlaw 2007).
III Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002).
I I2 Id. at 151.
113
114

Balbuena v. lOR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1258-60 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).
[d. at 1255-58.
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Court. I 15 It then declared: "We recognize, of course, that plaintiffs'
presence in this country without authorization is impermissible under
federal law. Standing alone, however, this transgression is insufficient to
justify denying plaintiffs a portion of the damages to which they are
otherwise entitled." 116
More recently, in Coma Corp. v. Kansas Department of Labor, the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that an undocumented worker was
eligible to receive not just compensatory damages for his employer's
failure to pay him wages that he had earned but also statutory penalty
damages authorized by a Kansas wage-hour law.1l7 In reaching this
conclusion, the court rejected the defendant employer's claim that the
plaintiff was precluded from bringing his lawsuit by both the IRCA and
Hoffman Plastics. I IS
Balbuena and Coma Corp. reveal two important points. First, they
represent the insistence with which some courts have declared the
irrelevancy of unlawful status in areas of the law outside the equalprotection doctrine. Second, they reveal that this trend has continued
from the days of Moreau in the 1970s to 2007 when Coma Corp. was
decided.
B. SEARCHING FOR THE SUPREME COURT'S UNARTICULATED
JUSTIFICATION FOR TREATING EQUAL-PROTECTION DOCTRINE AS
DIFFERENT FROM OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW

The above discussion reveals that for the last half-century, state and
federal courts have been recognizing illegal immigrants' rights to enjoy
the protection of a wide range of laws on the same basis as all other
members of American society. Yet the Court in Plyler v. Doe chose not
to follow this path when considering the scope of the Equal Protection
Clause. This section explores potential distinctions that the Plyler Court
may have drawn between the line of cases declining to recognize the

115 The Court of Appeals of New York pointed out that unlike in Hoffman Plastics, where the
undocumented immigrant plaintiff committed a criminal act under the IRCA by providing his
employer with fraudulent identifying documents, the plaintiffs in Balbuena did not commit a
criminal act under the IRCA. Id. at 1258. The Balbuena court noted that the plaintiffs in its case did
not produce any false documents to gain employment and were never asked by their employers to
present work authorization documents as required by the lRCA. It then highlighted the fact that the
")RCA does not make it a crime to work without documentation." Id. The Court of Appeals of New
York essentially limited Hoffman Plastics to the facts in that case and narrowed the reach of the
Hoffman Plastics holding. Id.
116
1d.
1\7
1\8

See Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep't of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1087, 1094 (Kan. 2007).
See id. at 1083-84.
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relevancy of unlawful status and its holding in Plyler. After concluding
that these explanations are unsatisfactory, it examines and responds to
concerns raised by Professors Michael Perry and Peter Schuck, both of
whose critiques support Plyler's endorsement of rational-basis review for
most state illegal-immigrant classifications.
1. Exploring Some Initial Explanations

In contrast to the cases discussed above, why did the Plyler majority
decide to hold that in the equal-protection realm, "undocumented status
is [not] a 'constitutional irrelevancy",?119 Why did the Supreme Court
conclude in Plyler that unlawful presence, in and of itself, affects an
individual's expectation of legal protections while several other courts
have, in contexts outside the Equal Protection Clause, found unlawful
presence completely irrelevant? The Court itself does not directly
provide an answer to these questions.
The Supreme Court's distinction between legal and illegal
immigrants is even less understandable when one considers that states,
unlike the federal government, typically do not have a legitimate
constitutional interest in evaluating the relationship between an alien and
the United States when drafting legislation. '20 As the Court noted in
Nyquist v. Mauclet, one of its most prominent alienage cases, "Congress,
as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization,
enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the
states." 121
Additionally, illegal immigrants share several of the same key
characteristics of legal immigrants that the Court felt justified the
application of strict-scrutiny review of state classifications of this latter
group. In Graham v. Richardson, the Court declared that "[a]liens as a
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.,,122 Legal immigrants, who
do not have the right to vote, often lack effective means to influence the
political process and are thus subject to political abuse by the states.
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
Nyquist v. Maudet, 432 U.S. I, 7 n.8 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976).
121 Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 n.8. The Supreme Court has held that only in a narrow set of
circumstances do states ever have a legitimate interest in even distinguishing its residents based on
their immigration status. This "political function" exception applies when distinguishing between
citizens and aliens "is fundamental to the definition and government of a state." Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979). This exception has been used to justify state distinctions between
aliens and citizens with respect to eligibility to hold public office, as well non-elective executive,
legislative, and judicial positions. Id. at 74.
122 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted).
119
120
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Similarly, illegal immigrants' unrepresented status, and the strong
popular sentiment against them, renders their community particularly
susceptible to discriminatory state and local action. 123 Like legal
immigrants, illegal immigrants are "subject to disadvantages not shared
by the remainder of the community.... are not entitled to vote and ...
are often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with our language and
customs.,,124 States' rising frustration with the federal government's
inability to slow the pace of illegal immigration presents an even
stronger reason to be concerned that unrepresented illegal immigrants
will be the victims of draconian sub-federallegislation. 125
Of course, one major difference between the cases finding unlawful
status irrelevant and cases involving state classifications of illegal
immigrants is that the former set of cases involved private disputes and
wrongs for which the courts allowed illegal immigrants to seek judicial
relief, while the latter set of cases typically involve the provision of
benefits by a state to its residents. By providing illegal immigrants
remedies for private disputes and wrongs, courts allow illegal immigrants
to collect damages and seek justice from private actors such as
employers and insurance companies. State and local governments do not
have to pay any of the direct costs of the illegal immigrants' recoveries
except for the administrative costs of allowing access to the courts. 126
On the other hand, in most Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection
cases it is the state that bears the expenses of a plaintiffs victory. This
means that allowing illegal immigrants to have strong equal protection of
the laws could be characterized as forcing the government to subsidize
an illegal entrant's continued presence in the country.127 Moreover,
concerns about a state's limited financial resources and its ability to
provide quality government services to all of its lawful residents
becomes a concern in a way not present when allowing illegal
immigrants to remedy private wrongs.
If these are the types of concerns driving the Supreme Court's
distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, however, it appears that
there is not so much something inherently relevant and wrong about an
immigrant's unlawful status when deciding the scope of protection to

Neuman, supra note 46, at 1449.
Hampton Y. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (footnote omitted).
125 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1450.
126 See Montoya y. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Diy. 1979)
("Should defendants be held liable on the policy, the State would not be subsidizing and indeed
aiding the alien to continue his illegal presence in this country. Rather, an insurance company
compensated for the risks it described and assumed would be paying in accord with its agreement. ").
123

124

127

[d.
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offer him or her under U.S. laws. Rather, the Plyler Court's real
justification for its distinction would then appear to be economic in
nature. As discussed earlier, the Court had listed a state's interest in
preserving its economic resources for those legally residing within its
borders l28 as a reason why courts should apply a weaker level of review
to state classifications of illegal immigrants. 129 The Court used this
economic justification, however, as an independent and separate
rationale for treating illegal immigrants differently, not simply as a way
to further support its claim that illegal status, standing alone, somehow
makes a constitutional difference. Moreover, traditionally the Supreme
Court has held that an asserted state interest in preserving limited
financial resources for citizens is not a sufficiently compelling
justification for an alienage classification. 13o Indeed, the Supreme Court
has declared that: "Since an alien as well as a citizen is a 'person' for
equal-protection purposes, a concern for fiscal integrity is [not a]
compelling ... justification for the questioned classification in these
Therefore, even in the context of an economic
cases .... ,,131
justification, we again return to the undeveloped idea that there is
something fundamentally important and relevant about an illegal
immigrant's unlawful status in the equal-protection arena but not other
areas of the law.
Another difference between the cases discussed above and Plyler
that may have influenced the Court's thinking is that the former group of
cases involved primarily statutory or common law rights and remedies
while Plyler involved constitutional doctrine. It is not clear, however,
what difference this should make. The Court did not provide any
guidance on this point. Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause
addresses itself to all persons in the United States' jurisdiction, making it
less likely, as a constitutional matter, that an illegal immigrant's unlawful
status should be relevant to equal-protection doctrine.
Ironically, one possible explanation for the Plyler Court's view of
the relevancy of an immigrant's unlawful status may be the mounting
public hostility toward illegal immigrants over the last few decades.
Illegal immigrants are a politically unpopular class. Thus, while a

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225-26 (1982).
As the discussion in Part IlLB reveals, the Plyler Court's economic justification for
distinguishing between legal and illegal immigrants does not stand up to a number of empirical
studies that have been conducted since the time the case was decided. These studies have found that
illegal immigrants make substantial economic contributions to their local communities and to the
nation as well.
130 Wishnie, supra note 23, at 505-06.
131 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
128
129
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number of lower courts were willing to overlook these individuals'
violations of the country's immigration laws, legal realism would suggest
that the Supreme Court may have felt uncomfortable doing so when
Plyler was decided in 1982, a period in which animus toward illegal
immigration was beginning to flourish. 132 The irony, of course, is that
one of the major purposes behind the Equal Protection Clause is to
protect the rights of unpopular and vulnerable groups. 133
2. Examining and Responding to Scholarly Justifications

Even though the Court did not explicitly articulate a reason for
treating unlawful status as relevant in the equal-protection context but
not in others, scholars have stepped in to fill this void. Professors
Michael Perry and Peter Schuck argue in favor of limiting the
constitutional rights and benefits accorded to noncitizens. These
arguments could be used to support and justify the Court's more
restrictive holding in Plyler (and against the more liberal holding with
respect to undocumented children and their access to education). By
addressing them, I aim to reveal their faults and urge that they be
disregarded if and when the Court decides to readdress the question of
the level of scrutiny applicable to illegal-immigrant classifications.
While discussing the Court's treatment of illegal immigrants in
Plyler, Michael Perry has argued that noncitizen status, both legal and
illegal, is a morally relevant factor when discussing what he identifies as
the principle behind equal-protection law.134 He posits: "It is tempting
to say, in a generous if unreflective spirit of egalitarianism, that a
person's status as an alien indicates nothing about the worth or desert of
the person. But such a statement would be problematic. Alienage is
conventionally, if implicitly, regarded as a morally relevant status.,,135

J32

See, e.g., Immigration Refonn and Control Act of 1986, 8 V.S.C.A. § 1324a (Westlaw

2007).
133 See Romer v. Evans, 517 V.S. 620,634 (1996); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
V.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
134 Perry, supra note 46, at 334; see also Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1061 (1979). According to Perry, "the
moral worth or status of a person is detennined by the nature and extent of the person's activities,
native talents, acquired skills, and need." Michael J. Perry, The Principle of Equal Protection, 32
HASTINGS LJ. 1133, 1138 (1981). If"a factor is not a detenninant ofa person's moral status - if the
factor does not itself refer to or indicate anything about a person's activities, talents, skills, or needs
- then that factor is morally irrelevant" and thus should not be used by a state as a basis for
detennining who is more or less deserving of respect and concern. Id. at 1138-39.
135 Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1061 (1979). Interestingly, Perry makes this observation with respect to legal
immigrants even though he concedes that "a person's status as an alien is [notl, without more, a
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He further argues that even if legal-immigrant status could be
characterized as immaterial, "a person's status, not as an alien, but as one
who is illegally present in the territorial jurisdiction in question indicating as it does that particular acts, acts contrary to law, have been
committed - does not seem to be a problematic basis for differential
treatment.,,136 The weakness of Perry's claims, however, is that they
draw their moral strength from questionable sources of morality: the
United States Constitution l37 and the importance of the concept of
formal, national citizenship.138
Perry contends that the Supreme Court should not be able to "deem
alienage to be a morally irrelevant status when to do that would be to
deny the validity of something the Constitution itself does, namely, treat
aliens and citizens differently for many purposes.,,139 An initial objection
to this position is that it is not clear why the Constitution is being
employed as a source of moral relevancy. A further objection is that,
while it is true that the Constitution does, at times, treat aliens and
citizens differently, it is also true that several of the Constitution's
provisions are addressed to all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States, not just to citizens. 14o The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is such a provision. 141 Indeed, it is even possible
to view the Constitution as primarily about persons, with citizenship
taking on significance only "in particular situations as a special case.,,142

reliable indicator of particular choices, activities, talents, or skills," the set of factors that he uses to
determine whether certain characteristics of classes of persons are morally irrelevant and thus
impermissible distinctions with which to justify state discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. [d. at 1066.
136 Perry, supra note 46, at 335.
137 [d. at 334; Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1066 (1979).
138 Michael 1. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1061 (1979).
139 [d. at 1066.
140 See. e.g., U.S. CON ST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ");
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury ... nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ").
141 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
142 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens. Aliens. Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 9, 21 (1990) (discussing several clauses within the Constitution which identified its
beneficiaries as persons or did not identify a specific beneficiary at all); see also ALEXANDER
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 54 (1975) ("[T]he concept of citizenship plays only the most
minimal role in the American constitutional scheme.").
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Thus, the mere fact that the Constitution draws some distinctions
between citizens and noncitizens does not mean, as Perry asserts, that it
"limits the jurisdiction of the principles of equal protection.,,143
Perry also argues, in a related manner, that the value and existence
of formal citizenship in American society provides further support for the
view that noncitizen status must be a morally relevant factor in the equalprotection context. According to Perry, a person, in at least some
respects, "is more deserving by virtue of his status as a citizen than a
person who is not a citizen."I44 Again, an initial objection to this
position is that Perry does not offer any support for his view that formal
citizenship, as opposed to some other vision of the sphere of moral
relevance such as notions of membership145 or personhood,146 is the
appropriate community with which to judge the morality of a state's
relationship with those in its jurisdiction. As Part III argues below, a
strong case can be made for a membership or participation model of
rights, rather than one that revolves around the primacy of formal
citizenship. A second problem with the significance that Perry attaches
to citizenship is that he incorrectly contends that alienage must be a
morally relevant consideration "unless one is prepared to abolish the
status of citizenship.,,147
Despite Perry's concerns, it is possible to have a coherent system of
rights that recognizes both the legal significance of formal citizenship
and the moral importance of a noncitizens' membership within a
community. Take political rights as an example. Today the right to
serve as an elected official and to vote in elections is typically limited to
citizens. Creating a subset of individuals within the United States that
can run for office and vote, however, "does not entail that persons
outside the subset are non-members" of American society, undeserving
of several of the important rights and benefits accorded to citizens. 148

143

Perry, supra note 46, at 334.

Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1061 (1979). Perry elaborates on this point by reasoning that: "The concept
of citizenship itself implies the existence of a central favored group; laws favoring citizens express
primary respect and concern for one's own 'family' or 'club.'" Id.
145 See. e.g., Joseph H. Carens, On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay, BOSTON
REV., Summer 2005, at I, available at http://bostonreview.netlBR30.3/carens.html.
146 See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Expanding the Circle of Membership by Reconstructing the
"Alien ": Lessons from Social Psychology and the "Promise Enforcement Cases," 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM I, 24 (1998); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional
Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 715-17 (1996).
147 Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1061 (1979).
148 Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 22; see also Karst, supra note 82, at 25.
144
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Valuing the role of citizenship in contemporary America is not the same
as, and does not require, denying the moral significance of the
contributions that noncitizens make to American society.
A last critique of Perry's articulation of the principle of equal
protection pertains to the importance that he places on illegal
immigrants' presence in the United States in violation of the law. Perry,
as well as the Plyler majority, subscribes to the view that by breaking the
country's immigration laws, illegal immigrants are bereft of any
legitimate expectation of receiving government benefits and the
protection of the laws accorded citizens and legal immigrants. 149 This
view, however, inaccurately stresses a static nature of morality. An
individual's actions at one point in time should not permanently affect
his moral standing or culpability at a later point in time. 150 This idea is
consistent with the use of moral judgments in other familiar areas of the
law such as the criminal justice system. Even though society may at one
point find that it is just to punish an individual for a wrongful act,151 over
time, most individuals who receive punishment are deemed to have
sufficiently paid their debt to society. Their initial act, which was
morally proscribed, is forgiven and no longer justifies their punishment
by the state. Similarly, over time, an illegal immigrant's original
condition of admission becomes morally irrelevant. 152 The longer that
such an immigrant lives in the United States and becomes a productive
member of American society, the more attenuated the moral significance
of his or her initial unlawful entry into the country.
Related to Perry's concerns, Peter Schuck has argued that giving too
many rights and constitutional protections to legal immigrants, and a
fortiori illegal immigrants, leads to a devaluation of American
citizenship. 153 This devaluation, in turn, has significant "emotional
consequences,,,154 which Schuck identifies as the weakening of formal
citizenship's ability to serve as a "bond among individuals in a polygot
society like ours in which there are relatively few other affective linkages

See Perry, supra note 46, at 335; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982).
See Carens, supra note 145, at 11.
lSI See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16-18 (3d ed. 2001); Alison
Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 437,441-42 (1993); Jason H. Lee, Note, Dislocated and Deprived: A Normative
Evaluation of Southeast Asian Criminal Responsibility and the Implications of Societal Fault, 11
MICH. 1. RACE & L. 671, 695 (2006).
IS2 Carens, supra note 145, at 11.
IS) See Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American
Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 13 (1989).
1S4 Id. at 14.
149

ISO
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or commonalities.,,155 This view highlights citizenship's ability to
signify a national community and build national consensus on important
political issues. 156
Providing illegal immigrants strong equal protection of the laws,
and thus implying their entitlement to receive several of the same
benefits as citizens, however, does not negatively affect citizenship's
ability to serve as a unifying force for those who possess it. The mere
fact that an illegal immigrant is provided the right to receive health-care
benefits or some other government service does not mean that an
American citizen will feel any less connected to a national American
community if, in fact, one can fairly be said to exist. 157 Moreover, I
agree with Alexander Aleinikoff that there is something "distasteful"
about afflicting a harm on certain individuals or excluding them from
benefits accorded to others in order to make the non-afflicted and
included "feel special.,,158 Finally, it is not clear at all why a national
community should necessarily center around citizenship. Instead, it
seems perfectly possible, and more logical, to develop a communitarian
ethos "among all persons living and working within the territory of the
United States.,,159 The bond amongst citizens created by their shared
American nationality, standing alone, is weak l60 and thus does not serve
as a solid springboard from which to develop a sense of belonging in
America. In a sense, then, the strength of the various sub-national
affiliations that Schuck identifies as potentially divisive forces - "ethnic,
wealth, gender, religious, and lingual differences" 161 - highlights the
impracticality, and more importantly, the impropriety of seeking to form
a national community grounded on citizenship. Ironically, given the
importance and power of certain sub-national affiliations to those living
within the United States, it may make more sense to construct a national
community in a way that acknowledges and leverages the power of these
more tangible ties rather than depending principally on the typically
distant commonality of citizenship.
Both Perry and Schuck present arguments in support of limiting the
constitutional rights and government benefits made available to illegal
immigrants. In this way, their contentions provide possible justifications
for the Plyler Court's decision to treat unlawful status as a constitutional
155
156

Id .
See id. at 14-15.

See Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 28-29.
Id. at 28.
159 Id . at 30.
157
158

160
161

Id . at 30-31.
Schuck, supra note 153, at 14.
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relevancy. As this section's discussion has begun to make clear,
however, Perry's and Schuck's views should not be accorded too much
weight, as they do not offer a satisfactory justification for the denial of
strong equal-protection rights to illegal immigrants, especially given the
harmful consequences that such a denial entails.
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND RELIANCE ON
STRONG EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS FOR ILLEGAL
IMMIGRANTS

Regardless of the reason, or lack thereof, for the Supreme Court's
finding that undocumented status is constitutionally relevant in the equalprotection context, there are a number of important reasons why the
Court should adopt the view of the several other courts 162 that have
overlooked an individual's immigration status when determining the
scope of the protection of the laws. First, as Gerald Neuman has pointed
out, holding classifications of illegal immigrants to a less-stringent
standard of review than those of legal immigrants may very well convert
the undocumented population into a community of outlaws living within
our borders. 163 This result seems patently unacceptable under any notion
of respect for individuals' dignity and humanity underlying the Equal
Protection Clause. 164 It would treat illegal immigrants as nonpersons
"beyond the effective protection of the laws" and subject to abuse by all
but assistance by none. 165 Proposition 187, passed by the California
electorate in 1994, is just one sign that this fear of turning illegal
immigrants into outlaws is not merely a hypothetical matter. 166 Although
the law was ultimately found to be preempted by the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, it
aggressively sought to deny illegal immigrants access to social services,
health care, and public education. 167
A second reason that the Supreme Court should reevaluate its
position that undocumented status is a relevant consideration in the
equal-protection context is that the Equal Protection Clause recognizes
the humanity of illegal immigrants in a way that preemption doctrine, the
other major tool that illegal immigrants can use to try to invalidate
See discussion of cases in Part II.A.
Neuman, supra note 46, at 1447-48.
164 [d. at 1448; Karst, supra note 82, at 4-8.
165 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1447-48.
166 [d. at 1448.
162

163

167

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1266 (C.D. Cal.

1997).
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discriminatory state classifications, does not. The protection of an
individual's rights under the Equal Protection Clause acknowledges his
personhood and right to basic support by the state in a way that the
preemption analysis' focus on federalism issues and constitutional
structure ignores. 168 As Harold Koh, Dean of Yale Law School, has
argued in stressing the importance of legal immigrants' abilities to utilize
the full force of the Equal Protection Clause:
I prefer an equal protection approach to a preemption approach, not
simply because it clearly separates what is constitutional from what
federal policy makers happen to think is wise, but more
fundamentally, because it answers, in a way that preemption reasoning
does not, the moral and philosophical claims that resident aliens make
. th'
agamst
elr state governments. 169

The same argument applies to illegal immigrants, whose personhood is
often devalued by discriminatory state laws, and who participate daily as
members of American society in a productive and oftentimes similar way
as citizens and legal immigrants. 17o
According undocumented immigrants strong equal-protection rights
is also important because preemption sometimes fails as an alternative
strategy. A recent example is Equal Access Education v. Merten, in
which a federal district court found that a blanket policy of Virginia postsecondary educational institutions denying admission to illegal
immigrants was not preempted by the exclusively federal authority to
regulate immigration. 171 In another example, in 2004, a federal district
judge in Arizona concluded that Arizona's Proposition 200,172 which
effectively prohibits all agencies in the state from administering "state
and local public benefits [to illegal immigrants] that are not federally
168 See Koh, supra note 25, at 98-99; Wishnie, supra note 23, at 511 n.96 ("Critics have
responded persuasively that preemption analysis leads to a 'hollow formalism' that denies the
equality and anticaste force of the equal protection analysis.").
169 Koh, supra note 52, at 99.
170 See discussion infra, Part III.B.
171 Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 608 (E.D. Va. 2004). The postsecondary institutions named in the complaint included George Mason University, James Madison
University, Northern Virginia Community College, the University of Virginia, Virginia
Commonwealth University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), and
the ColIege of William and Mary. Id. at 592. Denial of admission of undocumented applicants was
encouraged by the Attorney General of Virginia. See ALISON P. LANDRY, COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, IMMIGRATION LAW COMPLIANCE UPDATE
MEMORANDUM, Sept. 5, 2002, available at www.schev.edulAdminFaculty/lmmigrationMemo9-502APL.pdf.
172 The full text of the proposition as presented to Arizona voters in 2004 is available at
http://www.azsos.gov/electionl2004/infolPubPamphletienglishiprop200.pdf.
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mandated,,,173 was not precluded by the federal preemption doctrine
elaborated by the Supreme Court in De Canas v. Bica. 174 Strong equalprotection rights would allow undocumented immigrants to challenge the
admissions policies of Virginia's public, post-secondary educational
institutions. It would also allow them to fight for access to the myriad of
other rights and benefits that the doctrine of preemption cannot
safeguard, such as those regulated by Arizona's Proposition 200.
The Supreme Court should reject the distinction between legal and
illegal immigrants that it recognized in Plyler. It has failed to identify a
principled reason for claiming the relevancy of unlawful status in the
equal-protection sphere but not in other areas of the law. This failure is
particularly questionable given the important reasons for granting illegal
immigrants strong protections of the law and for treating them, like legal
immigrants, as a suspect class when dealing with equal-protection
claims.
III. THE PARTICIPATION MODEL OF RIGHTS: ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS AS
MEMBERS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY

The claim that illegal immigrants should receive the same level of
equal protection of the laws as legal immigrants gains further, normative
support from the application of a participation model of rights. 175 In
what follows, this article will layout the values and mechanics behind
the participation model. It will then apply this model to the case of
illegal immigrants.
A. THE PARTICIPATION MODEL DEFINED

The participation model of rights is relatively straightforward. It is
premised on the idea that membership in a community is what matters
morally when it comes to the distribution of most Constitutional
protections and government benefits. 176 Textually, it is consistent with

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-140.01(A) (West law 2007).
Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 TUC DCB, at 28 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2004); see
also 10shua 1. Herndon, Broken Borders: De Canas v. Bica and the Standards that Govern the
Validity oj State Measures Designed to Deter Undocumented Immigration, 12 TEX. HISP. 1.L. &
POL'y 31, 82-91 (2006) (discussing the district court's analysis of the preemption issue in Friendly
House v. Napolitano).
175 See A Theory oj Alien's Rights, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1292, 1292 (1983); Carens, supra note
145, at 10-11; see also AleinikotT, supra note 142, at 20-22.
176 Carens, supra note 145, at 6; see also Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits Jor Undocumented
Aliens: State Law into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REv. 219, 247 (1991) (discussing the
moral claim to benefits that illegal immigrants have due to their "contributions to economic growth
173

174
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the Constitution's explicit provision of several important rights to
persons (as opposed to citizens), as well as its declaration of other major
rights without identifying any specific beneficiary. 177
The driving force behind a participation based model has been
explained by political scientist Joseph Carens in the following manner:
Whatever their legal status, individuals who live in a society over an
extended period oftime become members of that society, as their lives
intertwine with the lives of others there. These human bonds provide
the basic contours of the rights that a state must guarantee; they cannot
be regarded as a matter of political discretion. 178
This view focuses on the social and economic interaction that an
individual has with the society that he or she lives in when determining a
claim to the protection of that society's laws. 179 It stresses three related
principles. First, an individual's legal status within a country (e.g.,
citizen, legal permanent resident, undocumented immigrant) is not the
fairest or most morally significant criterion with which to adjudge his or
her claim to rightS. 180 Second, the more an individual contributes to the
society that he or she lives in, the more he or she deserves to receive in
terms of rights and benefits. The participation model "correlates rights
with social and economic involvement.,,181 Third, the more an individual
acts like a citizen, the more he or she deserves to be treated like a citizen
by the state.
Of course, in making the argument in favor of a participation model

and social stability" in the United States).
177 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech .... "); U.S.
CON ST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."); Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 21. But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Constitution itself recognizes a basic difference
between citizens and aliens.").
178 Carens, supra note 145, at I.
179 The Rights o/Undocumented Aliens, supra note 75, at 1453.
180 See David Held, Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP 19, 20
(Geoff Andrew ed., 1991) (stressing the importance of "social participation" and involvement of
people in the community in which they live when defining the concept of citizenship); Bryan S.
Turner, Postmodern Culture/Modern Citizens, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 153, 159 (Bart
Van Steenbergen ed., 1994) ("Citizenship can be defined as a set of practices which constitute
individuals as competent members of a community. This definition involves a sociological
orientation because it avoids an emphasis on juridical or political definitions of citizenship."); see
also Schuck supra note 153, at 17 ("[T]he conception of membership that drives political institutions
has steadily grown more fluid, functional, and context-dependent and seems likely to become even
more so in the future.").
181 The Rights o/Undocumented Aliens, supra note 75, at 1453.
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of rights, I recognize that there are a number of citizens who contribute
very little to the country that they live in, yet are still accorded the full
panoply of rights that their country has to offer by dint of their
citizenship in that country. Indeed, many citizens contribute negatively
to the society that they are a part of by, for example, engaging in criminal
acts. The participation theory of rights advocated in this article,
however, relates specifically to the moral claims of those individuals
excluded from the full set of rights that a nation offers its citizens. As
such, this article is not arguing that everyone, including citizens, living in
the United States should receive rights commensurate to the amount and
type of social and economic contributions that they make to American
society. Rather, it is presenting a moral argument in support of
noncitizens' claims - including immigrants both legally and illegally in
the United States - to a larger set of rights and benefits that have
traditionally been limited to those with citizenship status. More
specifically, it is arguing that illegal immigrants should receive the same
Constitutional rights as legal immigrants who, as a class, have been
accorded strict-scrutiny protection under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, it is true that the Constitution rightfully treats citizenship
as a special requirement for some rights and purposes. As noted earlier,
the rights to vote and hold public office have been limited to citizens. 182
However, as Alexander Aleinikoff has pointed out when supporting the
extension of membership rights to legal immigrants, "one can understand
constitutional membership as extending to all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States even if the document privileges
citizenship in certain respects.,,183 Limiting the pool of individuals that
can vote and run for office does not lead to the conclusion that those
persons excluded from this pool are non-members of American society.
Formal citizenship and membership in a community are distinct
concepts. Each confers a different set of rights on its constituents, and
both can co-exist with one another.
B. THE PARTICIPATION MODEL ApPLIED
Some commentators have observed that, in its line of alienage cases
addressing classifications of legal immigrants, the Supreme Court has
182 Some have argued that even these rights should be extended to noncitizens as well. See.
e.g.. Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1092 (1977); Bryant Yuan Fu Yang, Note, Fightingfor an Equal Voice: Past and Present Struggle
for Noncitizen Enfranchisement, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57 (2006).
183 AleinikofT, supra note 142, at 22.
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already appeared, at times, to adopt the participation model of rights. 184
Indeed, in Graham v. Richardson, the Court struck down a statute that
sought to exclude permanent resident aliens from state welfare
programs. 185 In doing so, it noted that legal immigrants, like citizens,
pay taxes, are subject to the military draft, may live and work in a state
for several years, and contribute to a state's economy through the
purchasing and producing of goods. 186
Tacitly endorsing the
participation model, the Court recognized that "in day-to-day
terms, permanently residing aliens and citizens are . . . virtually
indistinguishable,,187 and thus determined that legal immigrants should be
accorded virtually the same set of rights and benefits as citizens. 188
The same logic that drove the Court's holding in Graham, which
exemplifies the participation theory of rights, should be applied to the
equal-protection analysis of illegal-immigrant classifications as well. In
nearly all respects, except for their immigration status, illegal immigrants
interact daily as members of American society in ways almost
indistinguishable from most legal immigrants and citizens. This is
significant for two reasons. First, it supports the idea that illegal
immigrants should be given several of the same rights and benefits as
citizens and legal immigrants because similarly situated people should be
treated similarly by the laws of a state. This notion is consistent with the
norms underlying equal-protection doctrine. 189 Second, similarity among
citizens, legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants supports a fairness
argument in favor of the irrelevancy of unlawful status in the equalprotection realm because, through their daily actions as members of
American society, illegal immigrants have helped contribute to the
vibrancy of their local communities and paid for many of the government
benefits (through taxes) that states have tried to take away from them. 190
184

Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 23-24; A Theory of Alien's Rights, supra note 175, at 1303-

07.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
1d.
187 Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 23; see also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973)
("Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and
contribute in myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden
when it deprives them of employment opportunities."); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645
(1973).
188 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.
189 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctf., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment ... is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
190 See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 296 (1989);
Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage
Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 217, 231-32 (1994); Reich, supra note 176, at 244-46.
185

186
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In this sense, allowing states to discriminate against illegal immigrants
under rational-basis review is unfair because illegal immigrants have
actually paid for part, if not all, of the benefits that they are being denied.
In what follows, I will briefly demonstrate the different ways that illegal
immigrants act as economic and social members of the United States and
thus have a moral claim to the same level of constitutional protections as
legal immigrants.
As discussed above, illegal immigrants contribute to the local
economies in which they live, as well as the national economy, in a
variety of ways identical to those in which legal immigrants and citizens
do. They work, oftentimes in jobs that others in the country do not wish
to occupyl91 and in ways that result in subsidiary job creation;'92 they pay
taxes; and they also contribute to economic expansion by acting as
consumers. 193 Today, an estimated one in twenty-five workers in the
United States is an illegal immigrant. 194 In California, which has by far
the largest illegal immigrant population in the country, roughly eight
percent of workers are undocumented. 195
Contrary to common
misperceptions, the majority of these immigrants do not work under the
table for labor contractors on farms or for small construction
companies. l96 Rather, they receive regular wages and year-end W-2
forms, and are employed by some of the nation's largest and best-known
companies. 197

191 According to the Pew Hispanic Center, twelve percent of workers in the food-preparation
industry are illegal immigrants, and "more than a quarter of a million illegal immigrants are janitors,
350,000 are maids and housekeepers and 300,000 are groundskeepers." Eduardo Porter, Here
Illegal/y, Working Hard and Paying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,2006, at l.
192 See, e.g., JAMES J. KIELKOPF, HISPANIC ADVOCACY AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN MINNESOTA 2
(2000),
available
at
www.hacermn.orgldownloads/English_ReportslEconomicImpactUndocumentedWorkers.pdf ("Up to 50,000
Minnesotans owe their jobs to the presence of undocumented labor in the industries that were
studied. On average, every undocumented worker that is removed from the economy causes another
worker somewhere in Minnesota to lose his or her job.").
193 Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and
Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. I, 3 (2006). According to the Pew Research
Center, illegal immigrants add 600,000 to 700,000 new consumers to the economy each year.
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS, http://www.lulac.orgladvocacylissueslimmigrationltruth.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2008).
194 JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 9.
Some have found this proportion of illegal immigrant
workers to be even higher at one out of every twenty workers in the United States. Porter, supra
note 191,at l.
195 JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 9.
196 Jd.
197 Jd.
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With respect to taxes, which help to fund government benefits,
studies have found that illegal immigrants pay billions of dollars
annually in all kinds of taxes, including sales, excise, property, income,
and payrol1. '98 At the federal level, illegal immigrants make payments
into benefits programs that they are not even lawfully permitted to draw
on such as Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance
Much of the $7 billion in the Social Security
programs. 199
Administration's suspense file 200 is believed to have been contributed by
2o,
Thus, illegal immigrants help subsidize a number
illegal immigrants.
of popular government benefits that millions of citizens enjoy each year.
At the state level, recent estimates have identified illegal-immigrant tax
contributions in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, even where
the local undocumented populations in these states were relatively
smal1. 202 While the research is inconclusive, a significant body of
empirical studies has found that illegal immigrants pay enough in taxes
to cover the costs of the social services that they use 203 and, in some
circumstances, have even contributed to a net fiscal gain for local
econornies. 204 Even in cases where a study found that the cost of services
198
199

Lipman, supra note 193, at 5.
Id. at 3-4.

200 The Social Security Administration suspense file keeps track of the amount of wages that
are taxed for collection but not credited to a specific worker. It serves as a proxy for the tax
contributions made by illegal immigrants who often provide employers with false social security
numbers.
201 Anna Quindlen, Undocumented. Indispensable, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 2006, at 78.

202 See.
e.g., SARAH BETH COFFEY, GEORGIA BUDGET AND POLICY INSTITUTE,
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN GEORGIA: TAX CONTRIBUTION AND FISCAL CONCERNS I (2006),
available at http://www.gbpi.org/pubs/garevenue/20060119.pdf; OREGON CENTER FOR PUBLIC
POLICY, ISSUE BRIEF: UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS ARE TAXPAYERS, TOO I (rev. ed. Apr. 10,2007),
available at http://www .ocpp.org/2007!issue07041 Oimmigranttaxeseng.pdf.
203 See. e.g., Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1197 (1997); Lipman, supra note
193, at 2; Reich, supra note 176, at 244-46; Sidney Weintraub, Illegal Immigrants in Texas: Impact
on Social Services and Related Considerations, 18 INT'L MIG. REV. 733, 745 (1984); Derrick Z.
Jackson, Undocumented Workers Contribute Plenty, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2006, at 13
("Analysts at Standard & Poor's wrote last week that there is no clear correlation between
undocumented families and local costs, as the states with the highest number of such families also
have relatively low unemployment rates, high property values, and strong income growth .... ").
But see ROBIN BAKER & RICH JONES, THE BELL POLICY CENTER, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES PAID IN
COLORADO BY UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS I (2006); DENNIS PROUTY, IOWA LEGISLATIVE
SERVICES AGENCY FISCAL SERVICES, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS' COST TO THE STATE 2-3
(2007) (noting that "legal residents are subsidizing illegal residents to some extent").
204 SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 296; Larry J. Obhof, The
Irrationality of Enforcement? An Economic Analysis of u.s. Immigration Law, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 163, 175-76 (2003); Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs. State Rights. and
Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L., at 227 ("[A] fair review of all the evidence shows that

undocumented aliens are, by the most reliable studies, a net gain for the economy, even if not for the
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used by illegal immigrants exceeded their tax contributions to state and
local coffers, they noted that this difference tended to be rather small,205
or at least a lot smaller than critics of illegal immigration would make it
appear. Moreover, to the extent that some illegal immigrants are using
more in services than what they contribute in taxes, they are behaving
just like many citizens. The Public Policy Institute of California has
noted that, due to the costs of public education, "most U.S. native
families with children probably receive more in services ... than they
pay in taxes.,,206
In addition to their role as economic actors in America, the longer
illegal immigrants remain in the United States, the stronger their social
and cultural connections become with the country, its way of life, and its
people?07 It is in this sense that they also have a moral claim to a wide
range of rights and strong constitutional protections as members of
American society.208 Scholars from varying disciplines have argued that
immigrants living in the United States often end up developing
significant ties to and identities defined by their experiences in America,
even while maintaining some degree of connection with their countries
of origin. 209 As noted by sociologist Peter Kivisto when discussing his
formulation of "transnational social spaces":
[P]lace counts .... Contrary to the image of transnational immigrants
living simultaneously in two worlds, in fact the vast majority is at any
moment located primarily in one place. If the location where they
spend most of their day-to-day lives is the receiving country, then over

polity .... ").
205 See, e.g., BAKER & JONES, supra note 203, at I ("All together, undocumented immigrant
tax payments are equal to 70 to 86 percent of the state and local governments' costs for providing
federally mandated services."). But see Edward Sifuentes, Researchers Disagree on fIlegal
Immigrant
Cost-Benefit
Analysis,
NORTH
COUNTY
TIMES,
Aug.
12,
2006,
http://www.nctimes.comlarticlesI2006/08/13/newsltop_storiesl2l_52_058_12_06.txt (noting that
some studies funded by conservative think tanks have found that illegal immigrants cost taxpayers
significantly more in the public services that they use than they contribute in taxes).
206 JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 9-10.
207 See Leo R. Chavez, Outside the Imagined Community: Undocumented Settlers and
Experiences of Incorporation, 18 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 257, 269 (1991) ("[T]he longer undocumented
immigrants reside in the United States, regardless of their motivations for migration and despite their
lack of documentation, the stronger and more numerous their ties to it become."); Carens, supra note
145, at I.
208 Carens, supra note 145, at 11.
209 See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447,
484 (2000) (within the context of describing citizenship as identity or solidarity); Chavez, supra note
207, at 267-69; Peter Kivisto, Theorizing Transnational Immigration: A Critical Review of Current
Efforts, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 549, 571-72 (2001).
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time the issues and concerns of that place will tend to take precedence
over the more removed issues and concerns ofthe homeland?lO

The roots that illegal immigrants establish in the United States, as
well as the social roles that they play in their communities, represent
another dimension in which they are active participants in American
society, deserving of similar treatment as all other members.
It has been suggested by some commentators that the Supreme
Court has actually showed signs that it is willing to adopt a participation
model of rights with respect to the equal protection of illegal
imrnigrants. 211 Alexander Aleinikoffidentifies, as an example, the Plyler
majority, which, despite its declaration that undocumented status is not a
constitutional irrelevancy, still applied an intermediate level of review to
the Texas statute at issue in that case. He argues that the Plyler analysis
can be interpreted as "grounded in the recognition that undocumented
children were likely to be permanent members of American society.,,212
Indeed, as noted earlier in this article, in striking down Texas's
discriminatory statute seeking to exclude undocumented children from
public schools, the Court hinted several times at the fact that
undocumented children are, and will continue to be, a part of American
society regardless of whether they are provided a free public
education. 213
Despite such an optimistic view of the Plyler majority's
implementation of a participation model of rights, however, the Court's
opinion was full of language suggesting that its endorsement of a
participation theory, if it even adopted one, was extremely limited. The
degree of significance attached by the Plyler Court to illegal immigrants'
contributions to, and membership in, American society was restricted to
undocumented children, whom the Court did not hold morally culpable
for their unlawful presence in the country.214 The Court had a much
different view of the parents of these children and other adult illegal

Kivisto, supra note 209, at 571.
See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 25.
212
1d.
210

211

2!3

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). The Court noted that:

[T)he record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification
will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or
citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to
achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our
boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime.
Id.
214

Bosniak, supra note 47, at 1123.
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immigrants, suggesting that their choices to violate the nation's
immigration laws singled them out as less entitled to the protection of the
states' laws.2I5 Unlike the district court opinion in the matter,216 it did
not recognize the degree to which adult illegal immigrants are members
of the national community.
However, while the Supreme Court may not yet have fully
embraced a participation model of illegal immigrant rights, the above
discussion suggests that it should. Illegal immigrants make significant
contributions to their communities as active members of American
society. In most economic and social respects, they are indistinguishable
from legal immigrants and citizens. They pay taxes, work, send their
kids to school, go to church, and shop just like everyone else in the
country. In this way, they embody the principles that underlie the
participation model of rights. Just as the Court has begun to subscribe to
the participation model when it comes to the rights of legal immigrants,
it should employ the participation model in its treatment of illegalimmigrant classifications as well.
This extension of the participation model to the equal-protection
doctrine's treatment of illegal immigrants is consistent with the principle
of equal citizenship that Professor Kenneth Karst powerfully identified
as the substantive core of the Equal Protection Clause. To Karst, "[t]he
essence of equal citizenship," and thus the Equal Protection Clause, "is
the dignity of full membership in ... society.,,217 This view stresses that
an individual should "be treated by the organized society as a respected,
responsible, and participating member.,,218
While Karst does not speak specifically on the (ir)relevancy of
undocumented status, he has used the concept of equal citizenship to
argue that classifications of noncitizens generally should be viewed by
the Court with suspicion, and has posited that equal citizenship "is
broader than the legal status of citizenship.,,219 Indeed, "the broader
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
The district court in Plyler explicitly recognized the membership of several illegal
immigrants within American society that made them worthy of receiving many of the same benefits
as those with legal immigration and citizen status. It noted:
215

216

[T]he subcategory of illegal aliens affected by section 21.031 consists of more or less settled
families, who have established deeper roots in this country than the much more typical
temporary worker. The plaintiff families in this suit, for example, have lived in Tyler for
years and are likely to remain unless deported. The state has accepted their taxes and its
citizens have profited by, perhaps even exploited, their labor.
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 591 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ajJ'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
217 Karst, supra note 82, at 5.
218 1d. at 4.
219 Id. at 25.
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principle of equal citizenship extends its core values to noncitizens,
because for most purposes they are members of our society :.220 Karst
also approves of the Supreme Court's decision to strike down Texas's
discriminatory statute in Plyler v. Doe,221 suggesting that an individual's
unlawful status does not affect his claim to equal citizenship and the
dignity of full membership in American society. In this sense, then,
according illegal immigrants the same equal-protection rights as legal
immigrants (close judicial scrutiny) is in accord with the substance of the
Equal Protection Clause. Conversely, viewing unlawful· status as
constitutionally relevant impermissibly denies illegal immigrants the
respect, responsibility, and participation rights 222 that they are morally
and constitutionally entitled to enjoy.
CONCLUSION

With an estimated population of twelve million in 2006,223 the
"shadow population" that the Plyler Court was so concerned about in
1982 has grown dramatically in size. This has made it imperative to
reexamine the declaration in Plyer that unlawful status is a
constitutionally relevant consideration, which has led to the commonly
accepted conclusion that state illegal-immigrant classifications are to be
subjected to only rational-basis review. 224 Since Plyler was decided, the
United States has witnessed a steady increase in anti-illegal-immigrant
sentiment as well as a proliferation of state and local laws denying basic
economic and social benefits to illegal immigrants. 225 This sentiment
and these laws seek to deprive the undocumented population of some of
the most basic elements of survival such as housing and health services.
In this way, they also seek to deprive undocumented individuals of their
humanity as well as the dignity of full membership in the communities in
which they live, work, and interact every day.
Under a rational-basis regime, illegal immigrants may soon be

220

ld. at 45.

KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING IN AMERICA:
CONSTITUTION 143-45 (1989).
222 Karst, supra note 82, at 25.
221

EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE

223 FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, How MANY ILLEGAL ALIENS?,
http://www.fairus.org/sitelPageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersb8ca (last visited Apr.
2,2008).
224 See, e.g., Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 182-83 (Nev. 2001); Am. G.!.
Forum v. Miller, 267 Cal. Rptr. 371, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
225 See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sep. 21, 2006) (Illegal Immigration Relief
Act Ordinance); Escondido, Ca., Ordinance 2006-38R (Oct. 18,2006) (Establishing Penalties for the
Harboring of Illegal Aliens in the City of Escondido).
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converted into an outlaw class within American society. This result is
unacceptable under the anti-caste principles animating the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 226 It is also morally
unacceptable when considering the fact that, aside from their unlawful
presence in the United States, illegal immigrants are virtually
indistinguishable in their activities from most citizens and legal
immigrants.
The Equal Protection Clause extends its protection to all persons
within the Untied States jurisdiction. The broad sweep of this language
is something for Americans to be proud of, as it underscores this nation's
universalist commitment to the preservation of human dignity. The
Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe, however, incorrectly rendered a
judgment that would allow illegal immigrants to be treated as
nonpersons. Accordingly, the Court should reconsider its holding in that
case and recognize the constitutional irrelevancy of unlawful status.
State classifications of illegal immigrants could then take their rightful
place in the modem line of alienage cases declaring that state
discrimination based on noncitizen status must be subjected to strictscrutiny review.

226 Karst, supra note 82, at 6 ("The principle of equal citizenship ... presumptively forbids
the organized society to treat an individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as
a nonparticipant. ").
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